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ABSTRACT
The incidence of bilateral trade costs is calculated here using neglected properties of the structural
gravity model, disaggregated by commodity and region, and re-aggregated into forms useful for economic
geography. For Canada's provinces, 1992- 2003, incidence is on average some five times higher for
sellers than for buyers. Sellers' incidence falls over time due to specialization, despite constant gravity
coefficients. This previously unrecognized globalizing force drives big reductions in 'constructed home
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yotov@drexel.eduThe large gravity literature has revealed much information about bilateral trade costs
(Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004). But the literature has not addressed the incidence of
trade costs. Incidence is what matters for most issues of regional specialization, welfare and
policy. For example, even with trade costs that are uniform over sectors, incidence dierences
across goods have non-uniform impacts on specialization, all else equal. As for welfare,
uniform trade cost reductions across trading partners, either exogenous or from infrastructure
policy, confer benets with incidence split unevenly between buyers and sellers. Recently
discovered properties of structural gravity are used here to calculate general equilibrium
sectoral incidence measures of trade costs for Canada's provinces, 1992-2003.
Canada's trade has been the focus of a prominent literature that draws wider implications
for economic geography from Canada's physical geography, sharp regional dierences and
high quality bilateral shipments data. We add to this literature new methods and new
empirical lessons. Inward and outward multilateral resistance (Anderson and van Wincoop,
2003, 2004) are identied here as buyers' and sellers' aggregate (across partners) incidences.
We calculate incidence and decompose incidence into domestic and international components.
We account for home bias due to trade costs, directly and through multilateral resistance,
in a new Constructed Home Bias (CHB) index. CHB gives the predicted value of internal
trade given the estimated trade costs relative to the predicted value of internal trade with
zero trade costs.
Our general equilibrium incidence measures are a natural extension of standard partial
equilibrium incidence measures. The latter divide the trade cost of a single shipment into
buyers' and sellers' margins relative to a hypothetical frictionless price such that the expen-
diture by the buyer and the net receipt of the seller is preserved. Our method aggregates
shipments and apportions incidence relative to a hypothetical `world' price such that aggre-
gate expenditures and net receipts are preserved. For sellers it is as if each origin region
pays a uniform-over-destinations trade cost to ship the same value of goods as in the ac-
tual equilibrium to a `world' market. For buyers it is as if each destination region pays
1a uniform-over-origins trade cost to bring home from a `world' market the same aggregate
value of goods from all origins as in the actual equilibrium. Multilateral resistance contrasts
with the market access and supplier access variables that have been used in the economic
geography literature1 to summarize the eect of bilateral trade costs. These do not measure
incidence, do not aggregate consistently, and our results show that they are weakly and
sometimes negatively correlated with multilateral resistance.
Bilateral trade costs are calculated from disaggregated gravity estimation. Distance and
border eects on trade costs vary widely by commodity in patterns that make intuitive sense.
Our gravity regressions t well and are reasonably stable over time, the same properties that
have legitimized the aggregate gravity literature.2 Our results indicate downward bias in
previous, mostly aggregate, gravity estimates of border eects such as Anderson and van
Wincoop (2003).
Sellers' incidence always exceeds buyers' incidence, about 5 times larger in the early 90's.
This striking regularity is consistent with supply being more aected than demand by the
equilibrium tendency to substitute away from high trade costs in the cross section of regions,
all else equal, as explained below in Proposition 2, drawing on Proposition 1.
Our most striking nding is that over time, sellers' incidence falls while buyers' inci-
dence rises slightly despite constant gravity coecients. Other authors have also observed
constant gravity coecients over time, a nding some call the `missing globalization puzzle'
(Coe, Subramanian and Tamarisa, 2002). The incidence changes drive a dramatic 16%-50%
fall in Constructed Home Bias in Canadian provinces, 1992-2003, averaging around 40%.
A previously unappreciated force of globalization changes multilateral resistances through
sellers' and buyers' share changes that reduce the total trade cost bill, as explained below in
Proposition 3.
Recognizing multilateral resistance changes as isomorphic to Total Factor Productivity
1See for example Redding and Venables (2004).
2Previous disaggregated gravity results in the literature indicating worse t and unreasonable coecients
appear to be due to failure to use xed eects to control for multilateral resistance.
2(TFP) changes,3 a linear approximation of the real GDP eect of the changes in outward and
inward multilateral resistances is calculated. All but Northwest Territories, Saskatchewan,
and Yukon gain. Prince Edward Island (PEI) gains most, followed by New Brunswick,
British Columbia, and Ontario. The magnitudes are economically signicant, averaging
across provinces to around 1/3 of the Canadian average for 1992-2003. For PEI the rise is
equal to its measured TFP growth over 1992-2003.
In contrast to falling sellers' incidences overall, Domestic Trade Cost (DTC) indexes for
Canada's provinces are constant over time. The Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT) of
1995 was intended to reduce internal trade costs, to oset the lower international incidence
documented here. Our econometric work nds no consistent evidence that the AIT can
be picked out from other forces that aect Canada's trade. We simulate the intent of the
AIT with hypothetical domestic cost reductions. A uniform decrease in interprovincial trade
costs promotes equality: the gain for the poorer and more remote regions is bigger than
the gain for the developed regions. Our simulations suggest the possibility of `immiserizing
globalization': a uniform fall in trade costs can harm the welfare of the 'core' regions through
a combination of sellers' incidence declines oset by buyers' incidence rises.
Sellers' incidence varies widely across industries for a single province and across provinces
for a single product line. More remote regions face higher sellers' incidence and products
likely to have high distribution margins have higher sellers' incidence. Buyers' incidence
varies less than sellers', but buyers' incidence is higher in more remote regions. Similarly,
the CHB and DTC indexes have sensible patterns of variation and magnitudes.
The conceptual base of the project is set out in Section 1. Section 2 deals with the appli-
cation methods and Section 3 describes the data used, with further details in the appendix.
Section 4 presents the results.
3See Anderson (2008) for full discussion.
31 Conceptual Base
Begin with denitions of variables. Let Xk
ij denote the value of shipments at destination prices
from origin i to destination j in goods class k. Let Ek
j denote the expenditure at destination
j on goods class k from all origins, while Y k
i denotes the sales of goods at destination prices
from i in goods class k to all destinations. Let tk
ij  1 denote the variable trade cost factor
on shipment of goods from i to j in class k. k is the elasticity of substitution parameter for
goods class k.
The budget constraints (one for each destination in each goods class) and the market
clearance equations (one for each origin in each goods class) together with a CES demand
system specication combine to yield the gravity model.
1.1 The Gravity Model
The CES demand function (for either nal or intermediate products) gives expenditure on
















i is the factory gate price and k







ij)1 k]1=(1 k), an implication of the budget constraint.












divide the market clearance equation by Y k. The result implies that world supply shares
are equal to world expenditure shares. With globally common CES preferences, the `world





























1 k = 1: (3)
Thus (2) implies that eectively origin i ships good k to a `world' market at average trade
cost k
i.
Next, use (2) to substitute for k
i pk
i in (1), the market clearance equation and the CES















































i is outward multilateral resistance, also interpreted as sellers' incidence. Then tij=k
i
is the bilateral buyers' incidence. P k
j , the CES price index, is equal to inward multilateral
resistance generated by (5)-(6). P k
j is interpreted as buyers' incidence because it is a CES
index of the bilateral buyers' resistances on ows from i to j in class k, the weights being
fY k
i =Y kg. It is as if buyers at j pay a uniform markup P k
j for the bundle of goods purchased
on the world market.
(4) leads to a useful quantication of home bias that summarizes the eect of all trade
costs acting to increase each province's trade with itself above the frictionless benchmark,
Ek
j Y k


















ij = 1;8i;j implies Pk
j = k
i = 1;8i;j, using (5)-(6).
5The Armington assumption of products dierentiated by place of origin can be explained
on the demand side by monopolistic competition forces and free entry to determine the 's.
It is alternatively explained on the supply side in Eaton and Kortum's Ricardian model
with random productivity draws that assign proportions of products to regions, the 's now
reecting absolute advantage in the productivity draw distributions while the role of 1  is
played by   where  is a Frechet distribution parameter reecting comparative advantage.
Moving outside the CES (or Frechet distribution) framework to include demand structures
with endogenous reservation prices has unexplored implications for gravity type estimation.
The gravity model nests inside many full general equilibrium models characterized by
trade separability: two stage budgeting and iceberg trade costs ) distribution uses resources
in the same proportions as production. This paper takes the supply and expenditure shares
as exogenously given. Iceberg trade costs can include xed costs, with xed costs helping
to explain the many zeroes that are found in bilateral trade ows. We abstract from xed
costs here because our econometric work will not be able to identify them. Implicitly, the
response of trade volume on the extensive margin is picked up as part of the variable cost,
as explained by Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008). This biases gravity coecients
upward as estimates of variable cost.
1.2 Properties of Multilateral Resistance
Multilateral resistances are ideal indexes in the following sense (Anderson and van Wincoop,
2004). If the actual set of bilateral trade costs is replaced by e tk
ij = P k
j k
i, all budget con-
straints and market clearance conditions continue to hold; and factory gate prices and supply
and expenditure shares remain constant. Thus fP k
j k
ig is the general equilibrium analog to
the incidence decomposition of the principles course.5
Since (5)-(6) solves for fk
i;P k
j g only up to a scalar for each class k, an additional
5In the one dimensional case, the buyers' price is also unchanged by replacing the actual tax with the
product of buyers' and sellers incidence factors. In the structural gravity model, the aggregate expenditure
and buyers' incidence remain constant but the actual purchase pattern shifts.
6restriction from a normalization is needed.6 (3) implies full general equilibrium consistency
between trade allocation within sectors and sectoral allocations within regions. Within
sectors, relative multilateral resistances are what matter,7 so alternative normalizations are
admissible for convenience in the absence of information on k
i pk
i 's. Our empirical procedure
is P k
i = 1;8k for a convenient reference region i. Other normalizations are used below for
clean theoretical results.
Three propositions about the properties of multilateral resistance help explain our results,
even though the conditions for them are unrealistic. The rst two characterize the cross
section pattern of multilateral resistances while the third proposition characterizes how share
changes aect home bias. Proofs are in Appendix D. Let bi denote the expenditure share
and si the supply share of country i, suppressing the goods class index k.





i are normalized to have equal averages, then multilateral resistances are (i) decreasing
in net import shares bi   si given supply shares si and (ii) decreasing in supply shares given
net import shares.
The intuition for 1(ii) is that larger regions trade more with themselves, hence less of
their trade incurs the border cost. This lowers multilateral resistance in larger regions. The





i and multilateral resistance is decreasing in the share bi(= si).8 Proposition 1 shows
that the same intuition applies even with net trade. The intuition for 1(i) is based on the
familiar transfer problem analysis. Trade costs induce home bias in expenditure shares,
hence a transfer recipient with bi si > 0 for given si experiences a terms of trade advantage
relative to its partners, expressed here as lower multilateral resistance. Other normalizations
introduce an additional expenditure share eect; see Appendix D.
6If f0
i;P0
j g is a solution then so is f0
i;P0
j =g.
7Specically, the trade ow in equation (4) is not aected by changes in the scalar  of the preceding
footnote.
8A related proposition in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) characterizes the comparative static eect of
introducing a small uniform border barrier in a one good balanced trade economy, reaching similar conclusions
and the same intuition.
7Next is a proposition that helps explain why our measures of outward multilateral resis-
tance exceed inward. Building on the intuition of Proposition 1, suppose that across regions
multilateral resistances tend to be lower the larger is the supply share and the larger is
the expenditure share. Suppose that this eect acts more powerfully with respect to supply
shares than expenditure shares, suggested by the observed greater variation in supply shares.
This pattern also plausibly reect specialization, with causation running from multilateral
resistances to supply (and demand) shares.
Proposition 2 If bilateral trade costs are symmetric and incidence is normalized so that
the 1    power transforms of average bilateral buyers' and sellers' incidences are equal,
then on average sellers' incidence exceeds buyers' incidence if and only if the covariance of
supply shares with outward multilateral resistance is more negative than the covariance of
expenditure shares with inward multilateral resistance.
Third, the comparative statics of multilateral resistance with respect to supply and ex-
penditure shares suggest why Constructed Home Bias falls over time. Dierentiate (5)-(6)
with respect to the shares at constant bilateral trade costs ftijg.9 The changes in the ex-
penditure shares reect response to factory gate price changes, possibly lagged, or changes
in tastes (for nal goods) or technology (for intermediate goods). The changes in the sup-
ply shares reect response to price changes, possibly lagged or changes in technology or
endowments. The price changes themselves are driven by exogenous technology, taste and
endowment parameter changes.
Proposition 3 Normalizing weighted average changes in multilateral resistance to zero,
Constructed Home Bias falls on average if and only if sales tend to fall from origins that
face high average bilateral buyers' incidence and purchases tend to fall from destinations that
face high average sellers' incidence.
The share change condition expresses the intuitive force of shipment bill minimizing ad-
justment of shares, reallocating both supply and demand at given costs of shipment to and
9Constant trade costs are implied by our results.
8from an `as if' unied world market.10 In full general equilibrium, economizing occurs on
many more margins than trade costs, the multilateral resistances are determined simulta-
neously with the shares, and there is no guarantee that the condition will be met.11 Our
results are at least consistent with the condition.
The necessary and sucient condition of Proposition 3 drives lower the average bilateral
incidences that are normalized to be equal in the condition of Proposition 2. Thus the share
changes in Proposition 3 are consistent with sellers' incidence exceeding buyers' incidence.
Individual CHB's may rise, but Appendix D indicates that this will be under special
conditions. Appendix D also helps interpret our empirical nding that P's rise gently over
time while 's fall.
2 Application Methods
The structural gravity model (4) can be estimated using xed eects to control for mul-
tilateral resistance and using proxies for bilateral trade cost such as distance and borders.
Estimates of multilateral resistance will be calculated from (5)-(6) based on the estimated
tij's.





1LNDISTij+2CB P Pij+3CB P Sij+4BRDR CAij+5SMCTRYij; (7)
where: LNDISTij is the logarithm of bilateral distance between trading partners i and j.
Motivated by Brown and Anderson (2002), who nd that provinces and states that share a
common border tend to have higher levels of trade, we introduce two variables that capture
contiguity: CB P Pij is a dummy variable equal to one if the two trading partners are
10No single actor minimizes, but rather the invisible hand of market forces.
11Literally minimizing the trade cost bill with respect to shares subject to the adding up constraint will
generally result in corner solutions. But because share changes aect marginal costs and benets on margins
other than trade costs, these `frictions' prevent the corners from being reached.
9provinces and they share a common border; similarly, CB P Sij reects the presence of
contiguous border when one of the trading partners is a province and the other is a state.
BRDR CAij is an indicator variable that captures the presence of an international Canadian
border. Finally, SMCTRYij takes a value of one for internal trade, e.g. when a province
trades with itself.12
The econometric model is completed by substituting (7) for tij, then expanding the
gravity equation with a multiplicative error term. The structural model implies that size-


















ij is the error term. The standard OLS procedure used to estimate (8), after translat-
ing it into a logarithmic form, has been criticized on two main grounds. First, it throws away
all the information contained in the zero trade ows.14 Second, it does not account for the
heteroskedasticity that is present in the trade data. To resolve these issues, we follow Santos
Silva and Tenreyro (2007) who propose estimating (8) in multiplicative form with a Poisson
Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator that utilizes the information contained in
the zero trade ows and tends to control for heteroskedasticity.
We use directional (source and destination) xed eects PPML with Eicker-White robust
standard errors to consistently estimate Equation (8) for each commodity and each year in
our sample. Our dependent variable deviates from the specication in (8) because, due to
lack of data on total imports of individual states, we were not able to construct expenditures
12See Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) for more discussion of the specication of (7).
13By bringing output and expenditure shares on the left-hand side in our estimations, we impose unitary
estimates of the coecients of theses variables, as suggested by theory, but we also address the issues of
heteroskedasticity in the trade data and of endogeneity in supply and expenditures.
14Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) develop a formal model of selection. Potential exporters must
absorb xed costs to enter a market, screening out the less productive ones. The HMR technique requires
an exogenous variable that enters selection but is excluded from determination of the volume of trade. In
their cross country case, common religion was the excluded variable, but in our state and province based
data set there is no plausible variable that diers across the observations.
10at the state level. Therefore, the eect of the missing expenditures in our specication is
picked up by the destination xed eects.
Multilateral resistance variables are computed using the estimated t's in (4)-(6) along
with a normalization. We set Alberta's inward multilateral resistances to be equal to one for
each good, (P k
AB)1 k = 1. Relative multilateral resistances are what matters for resource
allocation in general equilibrium.
One nal issue with the data must be resolved to calculate multilateral resistances. To
solve (4)-(6) we need data on individual state expenditures at the commodity level. Unfor-
tunately, we lack data on total US state imports. The problem is resolved by aggregating
to the US level for calculating multilateral resistances for Canadian provinces. Thus, the
inputs needed to solve the multilateral resistances system are the provincial outputs and
expenditures, the US output and expenditure and the ROW output and expenditure along
with the bilateral trade costs. The original bilateral trade costs come from gravity equa-
tions that give province to individual US state bilateral trade costs. These costs must be
aggregated consistently to form the appropriate US to province bilateral trade costs for the
multilateral resistance calculations. We form an aggregate bilateral trade cost from each
Canadian province to the US (aggregate), and from the US (aggregate) to each Canadian
province as follows. The generic commodity ships from Canadian province i to US state j
with trade cost (from gravity) given by tij. The average bilateral trade cost to the US from









where wij = Xij=
P
j2US Xij. The average bilateral trade cost from the US to Canadian









where wji = Xji=
P
j2US Xji. The last step in setting the system (4)-(6) in operational form
is to aggregate trade costs from the US (aggregate) to ROW, and from ROW to the US
11(aggregate). We follow the same procedure and dene the aggregate trade cost from the US









where wj;ROW = Xj;ROW=
P
j2US Xj;ROW. Finally, aggregate costs from ROW to the US









where wROW;j = XROW;j=
P
j2US XROW;j. After aggregating the US costs, we are able to
solve (4)-(6) for the inward and outward multilateral resistances at the commodity level for
each province and territory, the US as a whole, and the rest of the world.
3 Data Description
This study covers the period 1992-2003. The trading partners in our sample include all
Canadian provinces and territories,15 the fty US states and the District of Columbia, and
the rest of the world (ROW), which we dene as an aggregated region consisting of all
other countries. Data availability allowed us to investigate 19 commodities.16 In order to
estimate gravity and calculate multilateral resistances, we use industry level data on bilateral
15We treat Northwest Territories and Nunavut as one unit, even though they are separate since April 1,
1999.
16Commodity selection is based on (but is not completely identical to) the S-level of aggregation as classied
in the Statistics Canada's Hierarchical Structure of the I-O Commodity Classication (Revised: January 3,
2007). The 19 commodity categories include: Agriculture (crop and animal production); Mineral Fuels
(coal, natural gas, oil); Food; Leather, Rubber and Plastic Products; Textile Products; Hosiery, Clothing
and Accessories; Lumber and Wood Products; Furniture, Mattresses and Lamps; Wood Pulp, Paper and
Paper Products; Printing and Publishing; Primary Metal Products; Fabricated Metal Products; Machinery;
Motor Vehicles, Transportation Equipment and Parts; Electrical, Electronic, and Communications Products;
Non-metallic Mineral Products; Petroleum and Coal Products; Chemicals, Pharmaceutical, and Chemical
Products; Miscellaneous Manufactured Products. The few commodities missing from the complete S-level I-
O Commodity Classication spectrum are Forestry Products, Fish, Metal Ores, and Tobacco and Beverages.
Reliable bilateral trade data ware not available for those products.
12trade ows, output, and expenditures for each trading partner. In addition, we use data on
bilateral distances, population, contiguous borders, the presence or absence of provincial or
international borders, and elasticities of substitution at the commodity level. Lastly, we
generate a dummy variable to explore the eects the Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT),
eective since July 1, 1995, on trade ows and trade costs within Canada. Table 1 provides
summary statistics for the most important variables used in the estimations, for the rst and
the last years in our sample.17 Appendix A provides a detailed description of the data, the
data sources, and the data procedures.
4 Results
We begin with the results of estimating gravity equation (8) for each year and commodity
in our sample. Then, we calculate and analyze inward and outward multilateral resistances.
Next, we present constructed home bias indexes over provinces and time. These indicate
a signicant fall in home bias associated with trade-cost reducing eects of specialization.
A crude measure of the real GDP gains that result is calculated over 1992-2003. Next, we
present the domestic trade cost component of outward multilateral resistance, the average
incidence facing provincial sellers within Canada. Finally, we assess the eects of the Agree-
ment on Internal Trade, and perform counterfactual experiments to gauge how hypothetical
cost reductions from AIT would aect domestic trade cost indexes within Canada.
4.1 Gravity Results
Our gravity coecient estimates vary signicantly across commodities and are relatively
stable over time.18 Thus, the values in Table 2, which are the estimates for the mid-year in
17A summary statistics table for the rest of the variables is available upon request.
18The only exception is the distance coecient for Fuels, which is relatively unstable over the years.
The economic theory of gravity (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004) implies that gravity regressions pick
up relative trade costs in a cross section, and cannot reect changes in the level. Compression of trade
costs could occur over time as external trade costs fall relative to internal ones, but this force is apparently
absent. The eect of the fall in the level of trade costs might also be picked up by time-and-region dummy
13our sample, are representative for the rest of the gravity estimation results.19
Without going into details, we briey summarize our PPML gravity estimates, reported
in Table 2.20 The coecient on distance is always negative and signicant at any level.
There is signicant variability in the eect of distance on trade across dierent commodities.
Distance is a bigger obstacle to trade for low value/weight commodities such as Petroleum
and Coal, Paper and Paper Products, and Furniture, while a lesser obstacle for commodities
such as Electrical Products and Hosiery and Clothing. Transportation costs are the natural
explanation. Contiguity matters, but only when the common border is between a province
and a state. We nd weak evidence that contiguous provinces trade more with each other.
The estimate on CB P P, capturing the presence of a common border between provinces is
positive and signicant for only four of the nineteen commodities in our sample. However, we
nd strong evidence that trade ows are larger between contiguous provinces and states.21
This should not be surprising since almost every province is contiguous to at least one US
state, and this is likely to be a major trade partner as well. Our estimates present evidence
supporting the argument in Brown and Anderson (2002) that contiguous provinces and states
trade more with each other. Therefore, breaking the contiguity dummy variable into two is
important.
The international Canadian border has a big depressing eect on trade. For every com-
modity category, the point estimate of the coecient on BRDR CA is always negative and
very statistically and economically signicant. The Canadian border eect varies widely
across commodities.
Aggregation (a feature of almost all gravity investigations) biases gravity estimates.22 To
variables in the gravity model. (Unfortunately these can also reect forces other than trade costs, such as
scale economies, nonhomothetic preferences or other size related unobservable variables.) Our results do not
reveal any systematic decline in trade cost levels over time via this channel.
19Estimation results for individual commodities in each year are available upon request.
20We also estimate (8) using OLS. Comparisons between the PPML and the OLS estimates reveal that
the latter are biased upward. This is in accordance with the ndings from Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2007)
and Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008).
21Fuels is the only commodity category for which the coecient on the dummy variable capturing contiguity
between provinces and states is consistently insignicant.
22Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) provide an extensive discussion of aggregation bias in gravity esti-
14investigate aggregation bias, we estimate the gravity equation using data on aggregate trade
ows and output, obtained by summing up commodity level values for each province and
state. Estimation results, available upon request, reveal that the aggregate border eects
are signicantly lower than the average border eects estimated with commodity level data.
The aggregate border eects estimates are relatively stable over time.23
We nd some empirical evidence that internal provincial trade is higher than interprovin-
cial and international trade, all else equal. In other words, there is a provincial border
barrier.24 The point estimates of the coecient on the variable SMCTRY are positive and
signicant for about two-thirds of the commodities in our sample.
The overall good t and relative stability of the gravity coecient estimates over time
argue that our gravity regressions pick up a genuine statistical regularity, while the eco-
nomic theory of gravity assigns economic signicance to those coecients. These properties
have legitimized the empirical gravity literature based on aggregate data, so we think they
legitimize our disaggregated results.
4.2 Multilateral Resistance Results
Inward and outward multilateral resistance indexes are calculated by solving system (5)-(6),
normalized by setting the inward multilateral resistances for Alberta equal to one.25
mation, setting out forces pushing in either direction, and concluding that no theoretical presumption can
be created.
23Downward aggregation bias is present in both the PPML and the OLS estimates. The bias is more severe
in the OLS estimates, which provides an additional advantage of its PPML counterpart. The border eects
discussed in the paper are slightly larger than those inferred from aggregate trade ow data in Anderson
and van Wincoop (2003) using OLS as opposed to PPML.
24Wolf (2000) found evidence of US state border eects using aggregate shipments data. It should be
noted however, that the reference groups in the two studies are dierent. In our case, the reference group is
interprovincial as well as international trade, while Wolf compares intrastate trade to interstate trade only.
25Mechanically, we solve system (5)-(6) for the power transforms f(k
i )1 k;(Pk
j )1 kg. To obtain
f(k
i );(Pk
j )g, we use estimates of elasticity of substitution at the commodity level based on country level
data from Broda et al (2006). See the data appendix for details. Theory calls for valuing shipments at
delivered prices while our data is at FOB prices. Gravity coecients are unbiased by this practice because
the xed eects control for eect of the measurement error on the gravity equation. In contrast, the MR
estimates could be biased if the measurement errors in the shares Y i
k=Yk and E
j
k=Yk are correlated with the
calculated trade costs tk
ij. The alternative procedure is to use transport cost markups to value shipments
at CIF prices. These markups are well-known to be full of measurement error as well, so there is no ideal
15For the purposes of describing multilateral resistance over time, it seems desirable to have
a time-invariant normalization, resembling the use of CPI or GDP deators to convert current
prices to base year prices.26 The procedure we adopt is to convert Alberta's current inward
multilateral resistance into base year Alberta inward multilateral resistance.27 Thus, initially
we calculate MR's for each commodity with PA(t) = 1 for each year t. This yields (for each
commodity) a set fPi(t);i(t)g for each region i and year t. We aggregate the commodity
level MR's to form the provincial MR's. To convert them to intertemporally comparable
values, we construct an inator variable for Alberta, drawn from province level CPI's (for
goods only, excluding services). The inator is equal to A(t) = CPIA(t)=CPIA(1992). The
new set of `time-consistent' MR's is fA(t)Pi(t);(1=A(t))i(t)g. Conceptually, any region's
inward MR is converted to a 1992 dollars Alberta equivalent. For example, Pi(t)=PA(t) is
replaced by Pi(t)=PA(1992). The scale of outward MR's is inversely related to the scaling of
inward MR's due to the structure of (5)-(6), so outward MR's are also interpreted as being in
1992 Alberta dollars. The undeated series shows essentially at inward MR's and declining
outward MR's while the CPI deated series has upward trend in inward MR's and amplied
downward trend in outward MR's.
To gauge the signicance of our indexes, we calculate standard errors by bootstrapping
the constructed bilateral trade costs from our regression model. We adopt the following
procedure. First, we generate 150 sets of bootstrapped PPML coecient estimates, which
we use to calculate 150 sets of multilateral resistance indexes. We then use the bootstrapped
procedure.
26Within each year, only relative multilateral resistances have allocation consequences.
27The IMR values in principle are comparable to price indexes, and in particular their variation across
provinces might be expected to reect variation in consumer (or user) price indexes across provinces. The
IMR's have more variation than CPI's, and they only loosely track variations in consumer price indexes. The
dierence does not necessarily indicate problems with our approach of calculating IMR's. The dierence has
a number of explanations. First, the inward incidence of trade costs probably falls on intermediate goods
users in a way that does not show up in measured prices. Second, the production weighted IMR's are not
really conceptually comparable to the consumer price indexes of nal goods baskets. Third, home bias in
preferences may be indicated by our results. Home bias in preferences results in attributions to `trade costs'
that cannot show up in prices. But fourth, the IMR's are no doubt are subject to measurement error and
are based on a CES model that itself may be mis-specied. We think it is premature to adopt this negative
interpretation that vitiates our approach.





i=1([ INDi   [ IND)2
n
;
where: n is the number of bootstrapped samples;28 [ INDi is the index from the ith bootstrap
sample; and [ IND can be any index obtained from the original data.
We nd signicant variation, within reasonable bounds, in IMR's across provinces and
territories for a single product, and across commodity lines for a given province or territory.
For brevity we concentrate on IMR's aggregated over goods as they vary across provinces and
territories. Commodity level results are summarized in Appendix C.29 Table 3 summarizes
the evolution over time of IMR's by province and territory across all product lines.30 The
values in each column are the yearly average inward multilateral resistances for each province
across all goods weighted by the provincial expenditure share on each commodity. As can
be seen from the table the IMR values are precisely estimated. They are signicantly dif-
ferent across provinces, and the pattern of IMR variation makes good intuitive sense. More
`remote' regions, geographically and in terms of industry concentration, face larger buyers'
incidence: The Northwest Territories (NT)(including Nunavut), the Yukon Territories (YT),
and Newfoundland and Labrador (NL) are consistently among the regions with largest IMR
indexes. In contrast, Ontario (ON) and Quebec (QC) are consistently among the regions
with lowest buyers' incidence.
Alberta is representative of our results.31 Inward trade costs for most commodity cat-
egories put Alberta somewhere in the middle as compared to the high-cost NT, YT, and
NL on the one hand, and the low-cost ON and QC on the other. There are, however, a
few expected exceptions. Alberta has very low relative IMR indexes for several commodity
28To speed up the computational procedure, we set 110 as the cap for the number of iterations in the
system solving for the multilateral resistances. This resulted in less than 2% of instances where the system
did not converge. These cases were dropped from our bootstrapped samples.
29Estimation results at the commodity level are available upon request.
30Individual gures presenting the variation of internal multilateral resistance across regions are available
upon request.
31This made Alberta our choice for normalization.
17categories including Agricultural Products, Fuels, Mineral Products, Petroleum and Coal
Products, and Chemical Products. Given Alberta's fuels resources, it should be no surprise
that the inward trade costs for Fuels and Petroleum and Coal Products are relatively low.
The low inward multilateral resistance for Agricultural Products should also be expected
since Alberta is one of the biggest agricultural producing provinces in Canada. Chemical
Products is another industry where Alberta has a low inward multilateral resistance index,
higher only than the corresponding indexes for Ontario and Quebec. Along with ON and
QC, Alberta dominates production in this industry, especially when Petrochemicals and
Synthetic Resins are considered. Finally, Alberta has the fourth lowest inward trade cost
for Mineral Products, which reects the province's fourth place, after Ontario, Quebec, and
British Columbia, in terms of output share in this industry.
OMR's are also precisely estimated and they are considerably larger than the inward
multilateral resistances. The result is consistent with implications of Propositions 1 and 2.
Larger supply or expenditure shares tend to reduce multilateral resistances, by Proposition
1. The greater dispersion of supply shares drives average outward above average inward
multilateral resistance. The pattern also plausibly reects specialization, with causation
running from multilateral resistances to supply (and demand) allocations.32
The OMR's vary widely across industries for a single province and across provinces for
a single product line. The pattern of variation makes good sense for the most part. We
summarize our ndings about the variation of aggregated OMR's across provinces in Ta-
ble 4.33 This time, we use commodity shipment shares as weights in order to calculate the
average OMR's for each province or territory across all goods. Interestingly, the most devel-
oped regions, Ontario (ON) and Quebec (QC), face larger sellers' incidence along with the
32The large OMR's may at rst appear implausible, since they may appear to imply large relative factor
price dierences between regions for immobile factors. But this is not a necessary implication because the
large amount of regional specialization allows substantial factor price equality to coexist with large dierences
in OMR's. Note that our method in principle allows the construction of a k
i for a province i that produces
no k.
33We summarize our ndings about the patterns of OMR variation across commodity categories in Ap-
pendix C. Estimation results of our ndings about the patterns of OMR variation across commodity cate-
gories are available upon request.
18more remote regions, such as the Yukon Territories (YT) and Newfoundland and Labrador
(NL). On the other hand, the Northwest Territories (NT)(including Nunavut) are among the
regions with lowest sellers' incidence along with British Columbia (BC) and Alberta (AB).
The explanation for the high OMR values for ON and QC, as compared to the low indexes
for NT, BC, and AB, is that the latter three provinces export primarily resource commodities
with very low individual OMR indexes and our aggregation process attaches more weight to
those categories. For example, in the case of the Northwest Territories, the low OMR value is
driven by the fact that Fuels, which take more than 70% of NT's shipments, are a commodity
category with relatively low outward trade cost. Fuels also explain the low OMR values for
Alberta. Finally, British Columbia has very low relative outward multilateral resistances for
commodity categories such as Food, Leather, Rubber, and Plastic Products, Printing and
Publishing, Fabricated Metals, and Machinery, which represent the leading manufacturing
industries in the province.
For comparison, in Table 5, we report outward multilateral resistances obtained as a sim-
ple average across all commodity categories. This time, Ontario and Quebec are among the
provinces with lowest OMR's, while the Yukon Territories, the Northwest Territories, and
Newfoundland and Labrador have the three largest indexes. The explanation is the combi-
nation of remote vs. central geographical location and low vs. high industry concentration
in these regions.
Over time there is strong evidence of a decline in OMR's. See Tables 4 and 5. Since
gravity coecients are stable over time, we take the suggestion from Proposition 3 that the
decline in OMR's is interpreted as driven by economizing on the trade cost bill.
The pattern suggested by Proposition 1 holds up well in our data when applied to OMR's.
Columns (1)-(4) of Table 6 illustrate our results at the province level:34 the OMR transform

1 
i is signicantly increasing in output shares and increasing in net import shares. As
34To obtain these results, we correlate OMR's to the power of (1   ) with output shares and net import
shares for each province in our sample. NLS regressions estimating equations (16) and (17) at the province
level obtain very similar results. The latter are omitted for brevity but are available upon request.
19predicted by Proposition 1, most partial correlation coecients on output shares are positive
and signicant. The only three exceptions where we do not nd a signicant correlation are
NT, YT, and PE. Results on the correlation between the OMR's and the net import shares
are similar. This time, the only two insignicant correlation coecients are those of NT and
PE.
In contrast, the sign pattern is sometimes reversed for IMR's. Our partial correlations,
presented in Columns (1)-(4) of Table 7, indicate a mixed relationship between IMR's and
output shares and net import shares at the province level. Part of the explanation is econo-
metric: low variability in the inward MR indexes and hence the weak correlations with
output shares and net import shares. From a theoretical perspective, Proposition 1 imposes
unrealistic conditions, so its rejection by IMR data is not surprising.
MR's stand in sharp contrast to share-weighted Laspeyres indexes of bilateral trade
costs.35 Share-weighted indexes are `naive incidence' measures that put all incidence on
alternately the seller or buyer. In practice, naive and MR incidence measures are very sig-
nicantly dierent. We omit the tables with share-weighted indexes for brevity, but they
are available upon request.36 Several properties stand out. First, share-weighted indexes
vary across provinces in a counter-intuitive way. For example the Yukon Territories are
consistently among the regions with lowest trade costs. Our methods yield more plausi-
ble rankings. Second, the share-weighted index suggests that the `average' incidence of the
constant bilateral costs has increased over time, while outward multilateral resistance de-
creases over time. Third, there is unsystematic correlation between multilateral resistance
and share-weighted indexes of bilateral trade costs. As shown in columns 5-6 of Table 6,
OMR is positively correlated with the corresponding share-weighted index at the province
level.37 Most correlation coecients are positive and statistically dierent than zero, but
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37For consistency, we report the correlations between the MR transform to the power of (1   ) and the
20signicantly lower than one. YT and PE are the two provinces with insignicant coe-
cients. Interestingly, IMR is negatively correlated with its counterpart share-weighted index.
Columns 5-6 of Table 7 illustrate. Combined with the weak correlation in the OMR case,
this suggests that the share-weighted Laspeyres indexes are not informative about buyers'
or sellers' incidence.
Next, we investigate the correlation between the multilateral resistance indexes and the
corresponding xed eect gravity estimates. Results for the outward indexes at the province
level are presented in columns 7-8 of Table 6. On average, we nd a negative and signif-
icant correlation between the OMR's power transform 
1 
i and the outward xed eect
estimates.38 The correlation is not signicant for NT, ON, and YT. It is positive and signif-
icant for MB only. The relationships between the IMR's and their corresponding xed eect
estimates are stronger. Correlations, reported in 7-8 of Table 7, are mostly negative and very
signicant. PE is the only province for which we nd a positive and signicant correlation
between IMR and the gravity estimate of the destination xed eect. Overall, our results
reveal a positive and signicant, but far from perfect, correlation between the multilateral
resistances and their gravity estimates. This suggests that the gravity xed eect estimates
are an imperfect proxy for the MR indexes. The explanation is that the directional xed
eects account for other country-specic characteristics in addition to the MRs.
Constructed Home Bias captures the combined implications of gravity for home bias.









ii is the estimated from gravity internal trade cost for province or territory i and
commodity k relative to the smallest internal provincial trade cost for commodity k across
all provinces and territories.39 Recall that CHB is interpreted as the ratio of predicted
corresponding power transform of the share-weighted Laspeyres indexes.
38Since the xed eects are used as proxies for 
 1
i , we expect a negative correlation with 
1 
i .
39In most cases, the smallest internal provincial cost is the one in Prince Edward Island due to its small
size and, therefore, small internal distance.
21trade ows to predicted frictionless trade ows.40 Note that the normalization used to solve
system (4)-(6) does not play any role: CHB is independent of the normalization. Notice also
that CHB is independent of the elasticity of substitution because it is constructed using the
1 k power transforms of t's, 's and P's. The reported CHB values are calculated for each




Table 8 displays the variation and the evolution of CHB across the provinces and ter-
ritories in our sample. Three properties stand out. First, the values are all big, there is
massive home bias in trade ows. Second, CHB is larger for more remote and the smaller
regions and lower for more developed regions. In each year, the Yukon Territories (YT),
Prince Edward Island (PE), and Newfoundland and Labrador (NL) are the three regions
with highest CHB, while Ontario (ON) and Quebec (QC) are the two provinces with lowest
CHB. Third, most strikingly, home bias falls signicantly over time. Table 8 shows that, on
average, each Canadian province or territory experiences a relatively stable decrease in CHB
over time. The last row of Table 8 reports the percentage change in CHB. There is a very
economically signicant decrease in CHB for each province and territory. Ontario (ON) and
Quebec (QC) are the two provinces that experience the smallest CHB decrease. The change
for the rest of the regions is relatively homogeneous. It varies between 34% for the Yukon
Territories and 50% for the Northwest Territories.
The dramatic fall in CHB's reects `globalization', a fall in external (both international
and inter-provincial) trade costs relative to internal trade costs. The fall is not due to the
usual understanding of globalization because the tted tij's are nearly constant due to almost
constant gravity coecients.41 Instead, the fall in home bias is due to the general equilibrium
eect of changes in production and expenditure shares on multilateral resistance. Neverthe-
40A complementary approach captures another aspect of the eect of time on trade ows via the residual
xed eects, the dierence between directional xed eects and OMR's. Our results indicate no systematic
eect of time on home bias via this channel.
41We also note that the residual xed eects, the dierence between the estimated xed eects and the
calculated multilateral resistances, have no evident time series pattern. Thus our CHB fall contains all the
power of gravity to explain the fall in home bias.
22less, a fall in the level of trade costs42 could be causing the specialization in production over
time that drives the fall in constructed home bias.
Finally, the changes in OMR's and IMR's over the period 1992-2003 have sizable eects
on real GDP. We construct a crude approximation of real GDP changes as follows. Assume
for simplicity that no rent is associated with the trade barriers. Fix all the supply and
expenditure shares for a rst order approximation to the change in real GDP by province.43
The real GDP change is given by the sum of the eects of OMR changes on sellers and
the eects of IMR changes on buyers (both nal and intermediate). We use changes in the
undeated (current Alberta prices) MR's, but the measure we construct is invariant to the
normalization, as we explain below.
The gross eect of OMR changes on sellers from a particular province or territory is given
by a weighted average of the decreases in OMR's in each product, where the weights are the







where \ OMRi;k is the percentage decrease (as a positive number) in the outward multilateral
resistances that each province i faces when shipping product k to the rest of the world,
including all other Canadian provinces and territories, and WSw
i;k is the average product k's
shipment share in province i's shipments to the rest of the world for the period 1992-2003.
The gross eects on sellers and their bootstrapped standard errors are reported in column 2
of Table 9. The eects are positive for most provinces and territories. The sellers in Ontario
and Quebec are the ones to experience the largest and signicant gains. The eects on the
sellers in the more remote regions, even though negative, are not signicant. The negative
42The level of trade cost is not identiable from gravity because size-adjusted trade is invariant to equipro-
portionate reductions in bilateral trade costs.
43A full general equilibrium treatment requires specifying the upper level supply and expenditure allocation
processes, while treating rents requires marginal dead weight loss calculations.
44We also experiment by using the 1992 shares of shipments of each product in the total provincial
shipments and the results are very similar to the ones discussed here.
23values for those regions can be explained with intensied competition from the developed
regions and from the rest of the world.





where [ IMRi;k is the percentage decrease in the trade costs faced by buyers in province i
from 1992-2003, and WDi;k is product k's expenditure share in province i's total expenditure.
Gross eects on provincial buyers, reported in column 3 of Table 9, vary from statistically
insignicant to moderate losses. The explanation is that, as discussed earlier, the IMR's can
be thought of as consumer price indexes. Both the levels and the changes in the incidence
of trade costs fall much more on sellers than on buyers.
The net real GDP eect of the changing incidence of trade costs is the sum of columns 2
and 3 from Table 9, given in column 4. A fall in outward MR permits an accompanying rise
in `factory gate' prices and hence returns to primary factors. A rise in inward MR lowers
returns to primary factors due to intermediate input cost increases. The net eect on value
added is given by the sum of the two. This measure is isomorphic to change in Total Factor
Productivity. Real GDP changes are obtained by subtracting the eect of changing buyers'
incidence on the consumer price index.45 The changes imply economically signicant TFP
eects, averaging over 1/3 of Canada's TFP performance over the same period. In PEI's
case, the TFP eect of incidence (9% rise in real GDP from 1992 to 2003) equals the TFP
measure over the same period reported by Statistics Canada (2008).46
The gain from specialization is stronger for the more developed regions and weaker for the
more remote regions. For example, Ontario enjoys a 7% increase in real GDP and Quebec
experiences a 6% in real GDP. The corresponding numbers the Yukon Territories and the
45The normalization does not aect net welfare because an x% fall in outward MR induces an x% rise in
producer factory gate prices while an x% rise in inward MR induces an x% rise in input prices and nal
goods prices, the net eect canceling out.
46Author's calculation based on Table 7, which uses hours worked as the labor input.
24Northwest Territories are not signicant. Globalization in this sense increases inequality
among Canada's provinces and territories.
4.3 Incidence of Domestic Costs
Decompositions of multilateral resistance into domestic and international incidence is im-
portant for countries like Canada with sharp regional dierences. We focus here on the
decomposing the sellers' incidence of trade costs. The much bigger magnitude and intertem-
poral variation of supply side incidence justies concentrating on sellers, as does political
economy.
We dene the uniform domestic trade cost for inter-provincial trade that preserves each
province's shipments to Canada as a whole, and thus each province's shipments to the world
as a whole. Complementary to this we dene the uniform external trade cost that preserves
each province's shipments to the outside world.
Consider a generic product shipped from i to j within Canada, temporarily deleting the









where Y is world trade and the t's, P's and 's are tted values. The aggregate tted volume











from summing equation (9). Here the subscript C stands for within Canada.
The theoretical uniform trade cost is calculated with two steps. The rst step is a partial









This single equation can be solved for iC for each province i. iC is recognized as the
supply side incidence of domestic shipment costs using the same reasoning that identies
outward multilateral resistance on shipments to all locations as supply side incidence to a










The tted value of internal trade YiC being larger than the frictionless value, the term
multiplying k
i should ordinarily be less than one, satisfying the intuitive property that the
supply side incidence on domestic sales is lower than the incidence on all sales. Solidifying
intuition, note that the expression on the right-hand-side of equation (12) simplies to i
when aggregation is across all locations in the world instead of just across the regions within
Canada.
The same logic as in (12) yields the supply side incidence on external trade:













Here,  C denotes destinations not in Canada. Ordinarily i  C > i.
The general equilibrium solution is to solve for the iC's and the i's and Pj's simulta-
neously from the system formed by (11) combined with (5)-(6) and the normalization for all
i 2 C.47 DTC's are independent of the normalization because buyers' and sellers' incidence
47Sensitivity checks show that the uniform internal Canadian costs calculated in the general equilibrium
system are very close to the the corresponding costs obtained when we rst solve for the MR's using system
(4)-(6), and then substitute those MR's directly into to (11).
26appear as a product in (11).
In the setup above, tii is part of the tij;i 2 C. An alternative concept of domestic trade
costs aggregates interprovincial trade costs. Then in the preceding steps, iC is dened as
above for all i 6= j;i;j 2 C. while all other tij's remain unchanged: those inside Canadian
provinces and those for all trade that is not interprovincial. This interprovincial DTC is the
one we use.
Summary results for the DTC's for each province and territory across all commodities
and for each year in our sample are presented in Table 10.48 On average, the provincial
DTC's are a little less than half than the corresponding multilateral resistances.49 The
DTC's are very stable over time and uniform across provinces and territories. Since outward
multilateral resistance falls signicantly, that means that the second term of (12) rises, due
to tted shipments within Canada  YiC falling toward their frictionless level.
The method of decomposition in this section is very general and has many applications.
Our methodology can be adapted to decompose incidence of dierent trade cost component,
for example the portion of trade cost incidence due to distance vs. other causes, and so
forth. The method allows for trade cost aggregation for any specic region of interest.
4.4 Assessing the AIT
The Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT) is a voluntary agreement by provinces to reduce
barriers to trade within Canada that came into eect on July 1, 1995. To capture the AIT
eect econometrically we introduce a dummy variable, which takes a value of one for the
years after 1995 and a value of zero for the years before 1996, and we estimate equation (8)
using time-varying directional xed eects in a panel setting.50 To account for the potential
endogeneity of the AIT, we use the panel data econometric techniques applied to investigate
48In Appendix C, we discuss our ndings about DTC's at the commodity level. Estimation results are
available upon request.
49We perform mean comparison tests to nd that, without exception, each province faces signicantly
lower uniform trade costs to its Canadian partners as compared to the world as a whole.
50Moving the cuto date for the \AIT" variable forward and back in time to an earlier or a later year did
not have any eect on the signicance of our estimation coecients.
27the eects of free trade agreements on bilateral tradel ows in Baier and Bergstrand (2007).
More specically, in addition to the directional xed eects we also include country-pair xed
eects and estimate a dynamic version of equation (8). We nd no consistent evidence that
the AIT reduced Canada's internal trade costs.51 The estimates of the coecient on the AIT
dummy variable are small, they vary in sign, and are insignicant for almost all commodity
categories. The only two exceptions are Fuels and Machinery, for which the AIT coecient
is actually negative and signicant, and Transportation Products, for which the coecient
is negative and signicant. Overall, our econometric work nds no consistent evidence that
the AIT can be picked out from other forces that aect Canada's trade.
Possible eects of the intent of the AIT are revealed by counterfactual experiment. As-
sume that the rst year after the introduction of the AIT (1996), there is a uniform decrease
in all interprovincial bilateral trade costs. We re-calculate the multilateral resistance indexes
using the new bilateral trade costs and use the changes in trade costs to estimate the real
GDP eects in each province and territory.52 Our measures are impact eects at constant
supply and expenditure shares, with constancy imposed for simplicity in the absence of a
full general equilibrium model of demand and supply across sectors. We experiment with a
uniform decrease of 5%, 10%, 20%, and 30%, respectively.
Table 11 presents our ndings. Overall, we nd that any uniform decrease in interprovin-
cial trade costs lowers both OMR's and IMR's. More importantly, the responses of IMR's
and OMR's vary signicantly across industries for a single province and across provinces
for a single product line. The eect is much stronger for the outward multilateral resis-
tances, corresponding to the incidence of trade costs being more on the supply side. The
real GDP eects are calculated using the changes in OMR's and IMR's and the methodology
introduced in Section 4.2. The pass-through of the trade cost changes into welfare eects is
always less than one. The eects are stronger and more signicant the larger the decrease in
51Estimation results are available upon request.
52Our DTC methodology could be used to decompose the AIT welfare eects into those due to the domestic
trade cost reduction and those due to the full incidence changes. Moreover, the same techniques could be
applied to trace the welfare eects on producers and consumers by commodity category.
28trade costs. Our simulations indicate that a 5% or a 10% uniform decrease in interprovincial
trade costs is not sucient to generate signicant welfare eects. Therefore, in what follows,
we discuss the eects of the 30% decrease trade costs, which are presented in the last three
columns of Table 11.
Gross eects on provincial buyers are reported in column (10) of Table 11. Buyers in
most provinces gain from a reduction in interprovincial trade costs. The three exceptions are
British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec. The explanations is that when domestic Canadian
trade costs are decreased, rms from these industrial regions nd it more protable to `export'
to the rest of Canada, which naturally increases internal prices in the three provinces, hurting
buyers. The gross gains to sellers by province of origin are reported in column (11) of Table
11. They are positive for all provinces and territories and slightly stronger for the more
remote regions. The gross eect on sellers is systematically higher than on buyers.
The net real GDP eect is the sum of columns (10) and (11) in Table 11, given in
column (12). The gain is larger for the more remote and the smaller regions and lower
for the more developed regions. For example, the Yukon Territories, Newfoundland and
Labrador, and Prince Edward Island all enjoy an increase of about 25% in real GDP, while
the corresponding numbers for Ontario and Quebec are only 6% and 15%, respectively. Thus,
a uniform decrease in interprovincial trade costs would promote equality among the Canadian
provinces and territories. The fall in inequality is opposite to the result of globalization over
1992-2003. It is driven by a fall in bilateral trade costs rather than the eect of specialization.
Our simulations point to the theoretical possibility of `immiserizing globalization'. A
uniform fall in domestic Canadian trade costs induces `core' regions to trade more intensively
with the rest of Canada, raising prices to provincial buyers in core regions. Ontario's numbers
illustrate. The 6% loss to buyers happens to be more than oset by the 13% gain to sellers,
but the net positive eect is not guaranteed.
The non-neutral eects may imply that ecient trade cost policy should be tailored with
particular industries and particular provinces in mind. The conditional general equilibrium
29techniques used for the simulation of the eects of a hypothetical AIT are readily appli-
cable to dierent policy issues and exogenous shocks. For example, similar counterfactual
experiments could trace the eects on trade costs and welfare of the opening in 1997 of the
Confederation Bridge linking Prince Edward Island to the continental part of Canada.
5 Conclusion
This paper pioneers the application of multilateral resistance theory to economic geogra-
phy. Constructed home bias falls over time in Canada, due to a fall in sellers' incidence of
trade costs. The fall in sellers' incidence is driven by trade-cost-bill reducing reallocation
of supply and demand, a previously unappreciated force of globalization. Real GDP eects
on Canada's provinces are big, in some cases comparable to TFP performance in the same
period.
We decompose sellers' incidence to break out inter-provincial sellers' incidence. Inter-
provincial incidence is constant over time; globalization is acting on Canada's external trade.
The AIT was an attempt to promote internal trade but we nd no econometric evidence it
aected Canadian inter-provincial trade. Reecting AIT's intent, we simulated a uniform fall
in trade costs on within-Canada trade. It has unequal eects that promote equality between
the Canadian provinces and territories. The simulation indicates that general equilibrium
eects can amplify or oset the direct eect of a fall in internal trade costs.
Our results point to questions for future research. The cross sectional variation of multi-
lateral resistance over provinces and commodities is large, with large implications for resource
and expenditure allocation that can be checked. The decline in Constructed Home Bias de-
spite constant gravity coecients is striking. Does it extend beyond Canadian data? Does
sellers' incidence tend to fall with market share?
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34Table 3: Evolution of Weighted IMR's by Province
Year AB BC MB NB NL NS NT ON PE QC SK YT
1992 1.00 0.93 0.94 1.04 1.10 1.03 1.16 0.72 1.04 0.81 1.04 1.16
(.00) (.02) (.03) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.02) (.05) (.02) (.03) (.02)
1993 1.00 0.94 0.94 1.02 1.09 1.01 1.14 0.71 1.01 0.80 1.02 1.14
(.00) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.04) (.01) (.03) (.01)
1994 1.01 0.96 0.96 1.05 1.11 1.04 1.15 0.75 1.05 0.83 1.03 1.15
(.00) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.03) (.01) (.02) (.01)
1995 1.03 0.96 0.97 1.09 1.14 1.06 1.18 0.77 1.04 0.85 1.04 1.17
(.00) (.02) (.04) (.03) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.07) (.02) (.05) (.03)
1996 1.05 0.99 1.01 1.11 1.17 1.09 1.22 0.80 1.10 0.88 1.08 1.21
(.00) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.03) (.02) (.03) (.02)
1997 1.08 1.02 1.03 1.12 1.19 1.11 1.24 0.82 1.14 0.89 1.10 1.25
(.00) (.02) (.02) (.03) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.04) (.02) (.02) (.01)
1998 1.08 1.02 1.04 1.12 1.19 1.11 1.24 0.82 1.14 0.90 1.10 1.25
(.00) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.03) (.01) (.02) (.01)
1999 1.10 1.04 1.06 1.15 1.22 1.14 1.27 0.84 1.15 0.92 1.13 1.28
(.00) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01)
2000 1.14 1.08 1.12 1.19 1.26 1.19 1.34 0.89 1.21 0.97 1.18 1.34
(.00) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01)
2001 1.16 1.11 1.14 1.22 1.30 1.20 1.35 0.93 1.21 0.99 1.20 1.35
(.00) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.03) (.01) (.02) (.01)
2002 1.19 1.11 1.13 1.29 1.33 1.23 1.37 0.94 1.16 1.01 1.21 1.37
(.00) (.03) (.05) (.03) (.02) (.03) (.01) (.02) (.09) (.03) (.05) (.02)
2003 1.24 1.17 1.19 1.30 1.38 1.27 1.44 0.99 1.25 1.06 1.27 1.44
(.00) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.03) (.01) (.02) (.01)
Notes: Each provincial index in this table is calculated as a weighted average across all 19 commodity
categories with expenditure shares used as weights. All indexes are CPI deated as described in the text.
Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are obtained from 150 multilateral resistance sets calculated
with bootstrapped PPML coecient estimates as described in the text.
35Table 4: Evolution of Weighted OMR's by Province
Year AB BC MB NB NL NS NT ON PE QC SK YT
1992 3.66 4.31 6.73 4.05 5.12 6.17 3.89 8.47 5.61 6.30 4.71 6.21
(.2) (.17) (.45) (.16) (.19) (.25) (.38) (.56) (.56) (.27) (.7) (.25)
1993 3.90 4.24 6.97 3.97 4.83 6.29 4.58 8.64 5.85 6.35 5.13 7.27
(.19) (.14) (.4) (.13) (.18) (.26) (.51) (.66) (.52) (.3) (.6) (.31)
1994 3.54 3.76 6.21 3.62 4.50 5.66 4.09 6.84 5.11 5.39 4.58 6.45
(.15) (.11) (.34) (.11) (.2) (.31) (.41) (.64) (.36) (.29) (.47) (.29)
1995 3.60 3.91 6.66 3.64 4.45 6.19 4.09 8.01 5.39 5.84 4.69 6.50
(.18) (.11) (.37) (.1) (.15) (.27) (.47) (.64) (.39) (.27) (.5) (.25)
1996 3.49 3.80 6.08 3.46 4.11 5.81 4.53 6.99 5.09 5.26 4.28 7.13
(.19) (.1) (.33) (.08) (.12) (.21) (.56) (.52) (.31) (.22) (.46) (.31)
1997 3.10 3.66 5.83 3.44 4.08 5.55 4.09 6.53 4.91 5.04 3.99 6.34
(.12) (.08) (.26) (.07) (.12) (.17) (.34) (.39) (.23) (.16) (.34) (.22)
1998 3.31 3.84 5.95 3.65 3.96 5.82 3.78 6.41 4.80 4.98 4.03 6.06
(.11) (.08) (.26) (.11) (.13) (.2) (.24) (.36) (.24) (.16) (.33) (.22)
1999 3.14 3.81 5.88 3.47 3.93 5.53 3.99 6.47 4.83 4.74 3.89 6.32
(.1) (.09) (.21) (.07) (.14) (.16) (.31) (.43) (.15) (.15) (.19) (.25)
2000 2.95 3.68 5.74 3.21 3.55 5.11 3.25 6.25 4.99 4.57 3.67 5.08
(.13) (.09) (.23) (.06) (.14) (.16) (.33) (.54) (.18) (.17) (.2) (.24)
2001 2.84 3.48 5.62 3.05 3.32 4.76 3.15 5.76 4.62 4.61 3.68 4.39
(.09) (.07) (.23) (.06) (.11) (.13) (.2) (.35) (.17) (.15) (.23) (.18)
2002 2.89 3.45 6.13 3.09 2.64 4.89 2.87 5.51 5.13 4.43 4.09 5.66
(.08) (.13) (.55) (.11) (.07) (.17) (.17) (.33) (.52) (.15) (.46) (.23)
2003 2.55 3.02 4.89 2.57 2.54 4.03 3.01 5.01 4.37 3.78 3.34 4.54
(.08) (.06) (.19) (.04) (.1) (.08) (.18) (.26) (.17) (.09) (.16) (.13)
Notes: Each provincial index in this table is calculated as a weighted average across all 19 commodity
categories with output shares used as weights. All indexes are CPI deated as described in the text.
Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are obtained from 150 multilateral resistance sets calculated
with bootstrapped PPML coecient estimates as described in the text.
36Table 5: Evolution of Simple Average OMR's by Province
Year AB BC MB NB NL NS NT ON PE QC SK YT
1992 5.63 5.27 6.30 6.76 7.70 6.65 8.59 5.42 6.95 5.59 6.36 7.97
(.14) (.15) (.17) (.19) (.25) (.19) (.33) (.17) (.16) (.16) (.17) (.23)
1993 5.78 5.27 6.42 6.81 7.84 6.75 8.68 5.50 6.98 5.63 6.48 8.09
(.13) (.14) (.18) (.21) (.27) (.2) (.34) (.19) (.18) (.18) (.18) (.24)
1994 5.47 4.93 6.08 6.43 7.36 6.36 8.12 5.17 6.60 5.29 6.11 7.54
(.15) (.13) (.16) (.2) (.27) (.2) (.35) (.16) (.16) (.16) (.18) (.24)
1995 5.84 5.27 6.45 6.87 8.01 6.83 8.90 5.46 6.94 5.59 6.56 8.19
(.15) (.15) (.19) (.23) (.3) (.22) (.38) (.18) (.18) (.18) (.2) (.27)
1996 5.52 5.01 6.05 6.39 7.44 6.41 8.27 5.08 6.55 5.20 6.13 7.65
(.12) (.12) (.15) (.17) (.23) (.17) (.29) (.15) (.14) (.14) (.15) (.22)
1997 5.10 4.63 5.68 5.99 6.96 5.99 7.61 4.74 6.28 4.88 5.72 7.14
(.09) (.09) (.13) (.14) (.19) (.13) (.27) (.12) (.12) (.12) (.12) (.17)
1998 5.22 4.68 5.82 6.12 7.21 6.18 8.05 4.89 6.31 4.97 5.98 7.23
(.1) (.08) (.13) (.15) (.2) (.14) (.3) (.13) (.12) (.12) (.13) (.16)
1999 5.03 4.60 5.50 5.82 6.80 5.88 7.61 4.61 6.02 4.72 5.71 6.82
(.1) (.09) (.12) (.14) (.19) (.13) (.3) (.12) (.11) (.11) (.13) (.16)
2000 4.98 4.46 5.51 5.84 6.89 5.89 7.99 4.56 5.97 4.63 5.77 6.86
(.11) (.1) (.14) (.15) (.2) (.14) (.32) (.13) (.12) (.12) (.14) (.18)
2001 4.90 4.42 5.43 5.76 6.87 5.80 7.82 4.59 5.81 4.63 5.63 6.62
(.1) (.09) (.13) (.15) (.2) (.14) (.29) (.13) (.11) (.12) (.13) (.16)
2002 4.77 4.34 5.33 5.52 6.65 5.61 7.50 4.39 5.61 4.43 5.50 6.43
(.09) (.12) (.15) (.16) (.21) (.16) (.25) (.13) (.14) (.12) (.14) (.19)
2003 4.17 3.82 4.61 4.79 5.74 4.90 6.43 3.82 4.93 3.85 4.80 5.66
(.06) (.06) (.08) (.09) (.12) (.09) (.17) (.08) (.08) (.08) (.08) (.11)
Notes: Each of the provincial indexes in this table is obtained as a simple average across all commodity
categories. All indexes are CPI deated as described in the text. Standard errors, reported in
parentheses, are obtained from 150 multilateral resistance sets calculated with bootstrapped PPML
coecient estimates as described in the text.
37Table 6: OMR Correlations by Province
Output Shares Net Import Shares Gravity Costs Fixed Eects
Province Corr P-val Corr P-val Corr P-val Corr P-val
AB 0.258 0.000 0.284 0.000 0.179 0.007 - -
BC 0.417 0.000 0.369 0.000 0.259 0.000 -0.093 0.160
MB 0.407 0.000 0.464 0.000 0.134 0.043 0.156 0.018
NB 0.561 0.000 0.533 0.000 0.451 0.000 -0.262 0.000
NL 0.324 0.000 0.288 0.000 0.235 0.000 -0.206 0.002
NS 0.333 0.000 0.315 0.000 0.371 0.000 -0.295 0.000
NT 0.031 0.643 0.041 0.541 0.512 0.000 0.072 0.278
ON 0.226 0.001 0.359 0.000 0.335 0.000 -0.039 0.556
PE -0.005 0.940 -0.043 0.519 -0.009 0.890 -0.555 0.000
QC 0.210 0.001 0.143 0.031 0.467 0.000 -0.136 0.040
SK 0.247 0.000 0.257 0.000 0.245 0.000 -0.361 0.000
YT 0.013 0.847 0.201 0.002 0.051 0.454 -0.016 0.806
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Notes: This table reports correlations of 
1 
i with output shares, net import shares,
Laspeyres index trade costs, and exporter xed eects. Correlations between the OMR's
transform and output and net import shares are partial correlations. Gravity costs are
bilateral trade costs implied from the PPML estimations, aggregated per each province
and commodity with shipments used as weights. Exporter xed eects are the PPML
coecient estimates of the source xed eects. The sample size is always 228 (19*12).
Table 7: IMR Correlations by Province
Output Shares Net Import Shares Gravity Costs Fixed Eects
Province Corr P-val Corr P-val Corr P-val Corr P-val
BC 0.073 0.273 -0.097 0.144 -0.168 0.011 -0.092 0.168
MB 0.137 0.039 -0.151 0.023 -0.084 0.207 -0.196 0.003
NB -0.352 0.000 -0.361 0.000 -0.390 0.000 -0.541 0.000
NL 0.023 0.724 0.220 0.001 -0.325 0.000 -0.546 0.000
NS -0.083 0.214 -0.187 0.005 -0.278 0.000 -0.565 0.000
NT -0.256 0.000 -0.047 0.476 -0.142 0.032 -0.102 0.123
ON 0.405 0.000 -0.132 0.047 -0.157 0.017 -0.278 0.000
PE 0.021 0.750 0.049 0.465 -0.250 0.000 0.234 0.000
QC 0.124 0.063 0.012 0.859 -0.188 0.004 -0.280 0.000
SK -0.029 0.665 -0.044 0.513 -0.119 0.074 -0.553 0.000
YT -0.141 0.034 0.026 0.696 -0.118 0.075 -0.015 0.817
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Notes: This table reports correlations of P
1 
j with output shares, net import shares,
Laspeyres index trade costs, and exporter xed eects. Correlations between the IMR's
transform and output and net import shares are partial correlations. Gravity costs are
bilateral trade costs implied from the PPML estimations, aggregated per each province
and commodity with expenditures used as weights. Importer xed eects are the PPML
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































39Table 9: Trade Costs and Real GDP Eects by Province 1992-2003
Province Sellers Buyers Real GDP
Alberta 0.01 0.00 0.01
(.06) (.00) (.06)
British Columbia 0.09 -0.02 0.07
(.04) (.03) (.03)
Manitoba 0.05 -0.01 0.04
(.08) (.04) (.05)
New Brunswick 0.08 0.00 0.08
(.05) (.02) (.04)
Newfoundland and Labrador 0.01 0.00 0.01
(.06) (.01) (.06)
Northwest Territories -0.09 -0.01 -0.10
(.16) (.01) (.16)
Nova Scotia 0.06 -0.01 0.05
(.04) (.02) (.03)
Ontario 0.18 -0.10 0.07
(.07) (.05) (.04)
Prince Edward Island 0.06 0.03 0.09
(.09) (.05) (.06)
Quebec 0.13 -0.06 0.06
(.05) (.03) (.03)
Saskatchewan -0.03 0.02 -0.01
(.11) (.04) (.08)
Yukon -0.02 -0.01 -0.03
(.09) (.02) (.09)
(1) (2) (3)
Notes: Sellers' eect is calculated as the proportional change in outward resistances




Buyers' eect is calculated as the proportional change in inward resistances weighted
by expenditure shares:
P
k \ IMRi;kWDi;k. The real GDP eect is the sum of the
values in columns 2 and 3. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are obtained
from 150 sets of bootstrapped indexes.
40Table 10: Evolution of DTC by Province
Year AB BC MB NB NL NS NT ON PE QC SK YT
1992 2.46 2.85 3.29 2.30 2.77 2.93 2.29 5.52 2.94 3.35 2.53 3.18
(.11) (.07) (.11) (.05) (.07) (.08) (.3) (.31) (.12) (.11) (.16) (.14)
1993 2.57 2.88 3.36 2.23 2.65 2.95 2.78 5.44 2.92 3.26 2.66 3.70
(.12) (.06) (.11) (.05) (.07) (.09) (.35) (.35) (.13) (.12) (.16) (.17)
1994 2.46 2.69 3.20 2.13 2.54 2.82 2.50 4.59 2.82 2.82 2.77 3.41
(.13) (.07) (.12) (.05) (.09) (.12) (.32) (.37) (.12) (.11) (.17) (.18)
1995 2.53 2.66 3.40 2.12 2.54 2.93 2.61 5.13 2.85 2.94 2.77 3.50
(.12) (.06) (.11) (.04) (.05) (.08) (.29) (.33) (.09) (.09) (.15) (.13)
1996 2.55 2.68 3.26 2.11 2.45 2.86 2.74 4.86 2.92 2.82 2.74 3.90
(.12) (.05) (.12) (.04) (.05) (.06) (.35) (.28) (.1) (.07) (.18) (.2)
1997 2.26 2.72 3.08 2.18 2.61 2.86 2.21 4.74 2.84 2.73 2.48 3.11
(.12) (.05) (.11) (.04) (.05) (.06) (.22) (.23) (.09) (.06) (.17) (.11)
1998 2.40 2.91 3.14 2.30 2.57 2.93 2.19 4.70 2.78 2.79 2.55 2.84
(.08) (.05) (.1) (.04) (.06) (.07) (.16) (.22) (.08) (.06) (.13) (.12)
1999 2.40 2.84 3.19 2.29 2.57 2.94 2.36 4.90 2.88 2.81 2.51 3.08
(.1) (.05) (.08) (.03) (.08) (.05) (.21) (.24) (.06) (.05) (.11) (.12)
2000 2.41 3.04 3.39 2.32 2.58 2.99 2.29 5.56 2.97 2.96 2.52 3.01
(.14) (.06) (.09) (.04) (.12) (.06) (.32) (.36) (.07) (.06) (.13) (.21)
2001 2.33 2.95 3.40 2.26 2.47 2.88 2.14 5.13 2.82 2.93 2.51 2.71
(.09) (.05) (.1) (.04) (.07) (.06) (.16) (.27) (.06) (.06) (.11) (.13)
2002 2.52 2.96 3.72 2.33 2.26 3.06 2.56 5.16 3.06 2.90 2.78 3.51
(.11) (.04) (.11) (.04) (.08) (.06) (.2) (.24) (.11) (.05) (.07) (.11)
2003 2.38 2.75 3.29 2.18 2.25 2.85 2.32 5.05 2.91 2.75 2.51 3.10
(.1) (.04) (.07) (.04) (.1) (.04) (.17) (.22) (.05) (.04) (.08) (.11)
Notes: DTC indexes for each province-commodity pair are obtained simultaneously along with
multilateral resistances as described in the text. The numbers in this table are aggregates per province
across all commodities with output shares used as weights. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are
obtained from 150 multilateral resistance sets calculated with bootstrapped PPML coecient estimates
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The primary source of our data are Statistics Canada's tables 386-0001 and 386-0002, which
report data on interprovincial trade ows, provincial output, and provincial expenditures
at the S-level of commodity aggregation.53 Data on trade between Canadian provinces
and territories and individual states, as well as trade between the provinces and the rest
of the world (ROW) are from the Trade Data Online web interface of Industry Canada,
which provides access to Canadian and US trade data by product classied according to
NAICS.54 An advantage of this database is that it reports f.o.b. import values.55 We use the
United Nation Statistical Division (UNSD) Commodity Trade (COMTRADE) Data Base to
calculate trade ows for ROW, which we dene as the dierence between total world exports
and world exports to Canada and the US. We also use COMTRADE to get total US exports
and imports to and from ROW, which we employ to calculate aggregate commodity level
US expenditures. The latter data are needed to calculations multilateral resistances due
to lack of data on the imports of individual states from the world.56 COMTRADE's data
is in annual US dollars. We use the exchange rates tables of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Saint Louis to convert the values to Canadian dollars.57 Unavailability of state trade data
with the rest of the world, as well as interstate imports and exports caps the maximum
number of possible observations for each commodity in a given year to 1393 (64*64-51*53).
Data inspection shows that about 30% of the non-missing observations are zeroes with the
53Data for ve categories of commodities including Furniture, Fabricated Metals, Machinery, Transporta-
tion Products, and Miscellaneous was missing for the period 1992-1996. We have extrapolated those values
using provincial consumer price data from Statistics Canada's Table 326-0021.
54Concordance tables between NAICS and the S-level of commodity aggregation, as well as other classi-
cation concordances that we have prepared specically for this project, are available upon request.
55In principle, gravity theory calls for valuation of exports at delivered prices. In practice, valuation
of exports FOB avoids measurement error arising from poor quality transport cost data. This deviation
from theory is without consequence for our results save for possible eects on the multilateral resistance
calculations that will be examined below.
56Every 5 years, starting at 1993, the US department of transportation publishes a database, the Com-
modity Flow Survey, which includes interstate trade ows and individual state exports to the world. Unfor-
tunately, data for individual state imports is not available.
57Url: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/categories/283 The original source of the data is the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
43majority of those being for the `remote' regions such as YT, NT, and NL.
Industrial output level data comes from several sources. Provincial output at the S-level
of commodity disaggregation is from Statistics Canada's tables 386-0001 and 386-0002. As
discussed earlier, we extrapolate output data for ve commodities which are missing in the
original tables for the period 1992-1996. In addition, in order to complete the provincial
output data needed for calculation of multilateral resistances, we interpolate the rest of the
missing output values, which account for 11.6% of the observations. The primary source
of output data for individual states are the Regional Economic Accounts of the Bureau of
Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce, which provide industry output data at
producer prices in current US dollars classied according to SIC for the years before 1998,
and according to NAICS for the years after 1998. Data on output for ROW is mainly from
United Nations' UNIDO Industrial Statistics database, which reports industry level output
data at the 3 and 4-digit level of ISIC Code (Revisions 2 and 3). In addition to UNIDO,
we use the World Database of International Trade (BACI) database, constructed by CEPII,
as a secondary source of product level output data. Unfortunately, neither UNIDO nor
BACI provide data on agricultural and mining output. Therefore, we use two additional
data sources: the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAOSTAT) web page
provides data on agricultural output, and the Energy Information Administration provides
ocial energy statistics on the value of fuel production (including oil, natural gas, and coal)
for the world.
In order to calculate the multilateral resistance indexes, we need data on elasticities of
substitution at the commodity level. These data are obtained from Broda et al (2006) who
estimate and report 3-digit HS indexes for 73 countries including Canada. An additional
advantage of their elasticity estimates is that they are calculated for the period 1994-2003,
which almost coincides with the period of investigation in our study. We obtain the values
reported in the last column of Table 1 by aggregating the original Canadian indexes to the
S-level of commodity aggregation using the value of imports as weights. In addition, since
44some of the original indexes seem implausible,58 we bound the originals in the interval [4,12]
before aggregation. As can be seen from Table 1, the elasticity numbers seem plausible with
higher indexes for more homogeneous categories such as Fuels, Petroleum and Coal products
and Wood, Pulp, and Paper products, and lower values for Furniture and Transportation
products.
Provincial expenditures data are from Statistics Canada's tables 386-0001 and 386-0002.
As in the case of output, we need a complete set of expenditures in order to calculate
multilateral resistances. Therefore, in addition to extrapolating the values for the ve com-
modities for which data was not available for the period 1992-1996, we interpolate the rest
of the missing expenditures, which account for 5.2% of the observations. Commodity level
expenditures for the US and ROW are calculated as the sum of production and imports less
exports of each commodity in a given year.
To calculate bilateral distances we adopt the procedure from Mayer and Zignago (2006),









popjdkl where popk is the population of agglomeration k in
trading partner i, and popl is the population of agglomeration l in trading partner j.59 To
calculate population weights, we take the biggest 20 agglomerations (in terms of population)
in each trading partner when the partner is a province, a territory, or a state, and the biggest
50 cities when the partner is ROW.60 Finally, dkl is the distance between agglomeration k
and agglomeration l, measured in kilometers, and calculated by the Great Circle Distance
Formula.61 All data on latitude, longitude, and population is from the World Gazetteer web
page. A very appealing argument for the use of this particular approach in constructing
58For example the elasticity estimate for the 3-digit HS commodity category 680, which includes Articles
of asphalt, Panels,boards,tiles,blocks, Friction materials etc. is 195.95 while the estimate for category 853
including Electrical capacitors, Electrical resistors, Electric sound/visual signalling equipment etc. is 1.07.
59Head and Mayer (2000) propose the use of GDP shares rather than population shares as weights in the
distance formula. Even though using GDP shares is the better approach, data availability did not allow us
to use it in our analysis.
60In the few instances, where data was not available for 20 agglomerations within a single trading partner,
we take only the cities for which data is available.
61Following Mayer and Zignago (2006), we use 32.19 kilometers as inner-city distance.
45is that the same procedure is applied when we calculate internal distances and bilateral
distances. In addition, it allows us to consistently aggregate distances between any partner
and the rest of the world. Finally, we generate the dummy variables that pick up contiguous
borders and the presence of provincial or international border, as well as the eects of the
implementation of the Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT).
Appendix B: Proofs of Propositions
Take a representative good, so the superscript k is suppressed. Let sj denote country j's
share of world shipments (at delivered prices) of the generic good, while bi denotes the
expenditure share of country i on the generic good.
























j bj. Multiply both sides of (15) by 
1 
i and multiply
both sides of (14) by P
1 








(1   t1 )(bi   si)
 h0t1  :
Then substitute into (14) and extract the positive root62 of the resulting quadratic equation
in the transform 
1 









where the equivalence is shown by summing the preceding equation. Then:
2
1 
i = i +
q
2
i + 4(1   t1 )si (16)
62The positive root of the quadratic is necessary for  > 0.
46where
i =  ht
1  +









i + 4(1   t1 )si: (17)
Both Pi and i are decreasing in supply share si for given net import shares bi   si and
decreasing in import shares for given supply shares.k
The solution for  h =  h0 is implicit in the next expression, obtained from using the
denition of  h and the preceding solution for i,










where i is given as a function of  h above.
Alternative normalizations that shift  h= h0 far from 1 blur the clarity of Proposition 1 by
inducing a separate inuence of expenditure shares on multilateral resistances. The term
under the radical in (16) becomes 2
i +4(1 t1 )[si bi(1  h= h0)], all other terms remaining
the same. Propositions 2 and 3 similarly use normalizations chosen to reach clean results.




























Here, n is the number of regions. Sum the preceding equations, subtract the second from






















































ij . The left hand side is nega-
tive when sellers' incidence exceeds buyers' incidence on average. On the right hand side,
with symmetric trade costs, wj = w0
j;8j, hence the right hand side is equal to Cov( 1;s) 









j ]=n < 0.k
The conditions of Proposition 2 imply that average  exceeds average P.
Proof of Proposition 3 Let CHB = fCHBig. Let b p denote the vector of proportional
rates of change in fP
 1
j g and let b  denote the vector of proportional rates of change in
f
 1
i g. Let  denote the vector of ones.
Dierentiating (5)-(6) at constant t's yields
 b p = W
0(b s + b ) (18)
 b  = 
(b b + b p); (19)
where 






















 =  = W 0. Adding (18) to (19):
\ CHB = b p + b  =  W
0b s   
b b   W
0b    
b p: (20)
Average CHB is given by

0\ CHB =  
0W
0b s   
0
b b
using the normalization 0W 0b  + 0
b p = 00. 0\ CHB < 0 () 0W 0b s + 0
b b > 0:k
Because shares sum to 1, 0ds = 0db = 0, the condition W 0b s > 0 implies that changes





negatively correlated with average bilateral buyers' incidences facing each origin i while the
condition 




j(tij=Pj)1 ] and hence negatively correlated with average bilateral sellers'
48incidences facing each destination j. Proposition 3 means a fall in average CHB implies that
the forces driving the equilibrium changes in shares act to reduce the total trade cost bill.
System (18)-(19) yields an interpretation of our nding that 's fall while P's rise.
Normalize the multilateral resistance changes by 
b p = 0. Then
b  =  
b b;
b p = W
0[
b b   b s]:
Outward multilateral resistances fall if 
b b > 0 and the given normalization. Inward multi-
lateral resistances may rise or fall.
Appendix C: Trade Costs by Product
IMR's. Our ndings indicate that Agricultural Products, Chemical Products, Petroleum
and Coal Products, Fuels, Wood Products, and Paper Products have consistently high rela-
tive inward multilateral resistances across almost all provinces and territories. On the other
hand, Leather, Rubber and Plastic Products, Printing and Publishing Products, Trans-
portation Products, and Textile Products have consistently low relative IMR indexes across
dierent provinces and territories. A natural explanation for such ndings could be indus-
try concentration: On the one hand, Agriculture, Fuels, Petroleum and Coal Products, and
Wood Products are all resource industries with high concentration in certain regions. On the
other hand, Printing and Publishing Industry, which has the lowest IMR's, is considered the
most widely dispersed Canadian manufacturing industry. Industry concentration does not
explain the low inward multilateral resistance in the Textile and Apparel industry, which is
mainly concentrated in Ontario and Quebec. Through intensive capital investment over the
last several decades, the Canadian Textile and Apparel industry has gained eciency and
has become more and more competitive on the world market. A big proportion of domestic
49demand is met by domestic production, which naturally translates into lower trade costs for
the Canadian Consumer.
OMR's. We nd that Furniture, Printing and Publishing Products, and Transporta-
tion Products are always the three commodity categories with highest outward trade costs
regardless of the province or territory in question, while Fuels, Machinery, Electrical Prod-
ucts, Petroleum and Coal Products, and Chemical Products are consistently among those
with lowest OMR indexes. World competition is a natural candidate to explain our ndings:
Given, Canadian resources, Fuels and Petroleum and Coal Products are among the prod-
ucts for which Canada has clear advantage on the world market, while at the same time, it
faces erce competition in sectors such as Transportation Products. In both cases we draw
intuition from Proposition 1 that in the special case of uniform inter-regional trade costs,
the OMR is decreasing in supply share.
Gravity Implied Trade Costs. We nd wide variability of implied trade costs across
commodities: Transportation Products and Furniture have signicantly higher values, while
resource commodities have low implied values. This is similar to the OMR ndings. We
nd no clear trend in the time evolution of gravity trade costs at the commodity level. In
contrast, outward multilateral resistance indexes fall over time at the product level. As in
the case of our comparisons at the province level, this suggests that gravity implied trade
costs are not informative about the sellers' incidence.
DTC's. We nd some dierences and some similarities between the distributions of
OMR's and provincial domestic trade costs to Canada when we compare them at the com-
modity level. OMR's and DTC's are quite similar for the `resource' commodity categories
such as Agriculture, Fuels, Food, Paper, Wood Products, and Petroleum and Coal Prod-
ucts. A possible explanation for this is the large home bias in consumption of those goods.
Outward multilateral resistances are signicantly higher than domestic trade costs for com-
modities such as Printing and Publishing Products, Transportation Products, Electric and
Electrical Products, and Machinery. Finally, there are also some commodity categories for
50which DTC's exceed the corresponding OMR indexes. These products include Chemicals and
Chemical Products and Textile Products. Overall, in contrast to our comparisons between
OMR's and DTC's at the provincial level, we do not nd clear empirical evidence that the
outward multilateral resistance indexes are higher than their DTC counterparts. This sug-
gests that there are new empirical insights to be drawn from a more thorough investigation
at the commodity level.
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